ClubMed? Cyclical fluctuations in the Mediterranean basin by Fabio Canova & Matteo Ciccarelli
ClubMed? Cyclical ￿ uctuations in the
Mediterranean basin￿
Fabio Canovay
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11 Introduction
The nature and the transmission properties of business cycles have dramatically
changed since the early 1980s. On the one hand, emerging market economies now
play an important role in shaping world business cycles, previously determined by
a handful of developed countries. On the other, trade and ￿nancial linkages have
increased, making international spillovers potentially much more relevant than in the
past. While Latin America and Asia are leading examples of these new tendencies
and the evolution of their business cycles features has been extensively documented in
the literature (see Kose and Prasad (2010) for a recent account), much less is known
about the cyclical ￿ uctuations in other areas, and whether their time variations con-
form to these international tendencies. This paper partially ￿lls the gap providing
evidence on the features and the evolution of business cycles in 16 Mediterranean
countries and on the extent of interdependencies present in the area.
Why focusing attention on the Mediterranean? At least two reasons come to
mind. First, the basin is a miniature world economy, in the sense that developed,
emerging and frontier economies are well represented. Moreover, countries are in
close regional proximity and share a number of cultural, identity and historical traits.
Thus, the area o⁄ers an ideal laboratory to also study the connection between business
cycles and the level of development and to better understand the role that national
idiosyncrasies have in shaping business cycles and the international transmission of
cyclical shocks. The literature has extensively debated the topic but no consensus
has been reached. For example, Kydland and Zarazaga (2002), Aguiar and Gopinath
(2008), among others, have argued that business cycles in developed and developing
countries are alike and that di⁄erences in the productivity process are su¢ cient to
account for existing cyclical di⁄erences. Chang and Fernandez (2010), Benczur and
Raftai (2010), and Garcia-Cicco et al. (2011), instead suggest that heterogeneities
are pervasive and that cyclical di⁄erences in the two groups of countries have to do
more with the structure of the economies than with the productivity process.
2Second, the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM) partnership (see www.eeas.europa.eu
/euromed/ index_en.htm), which started with the Barcelona process in 1995, seeks
the establishment of free trade agreements in the area, wants to promote regional
interdependences, and intends to share the prosperity the new order generates. The
conventional wisdom suggests that increased cross-border interdependences should
lead to convergence of business cycle ￿ uctuations. Greater openness to trade and in-
creased ￿nancial and migration ￿ ows should, in fact, make economies more sensitive
to external shocks and increase the comovements of domestic and foreign variables
by expanding or intensifying the channels through which shocks spill across coun-
tries. An alternative view indicates that increased economic integration could lead
to more asynchronous output ￿ uctuations, as countries specialize in the production
of goods for which they have comparative advantage, and freely trade them in the
world markets. Thus, production cycles could become completely idiosyncratic while
consumption cycles are perfectly correlated (see e.g. Heathcothe and Perri, 2004).
Helbling and Bayoumi (2003), Kose et al. (2009), Walti (2009), Altug and Bildirici
(2010) among others, have studied whether world business cycles are converging or
not, but the evidence they produced is somewhat contradictory. Nevertheless, investi-
gators studying the phenomena have noticed that world business cycles have changed
following the ￿nancial crisis of 2008 and that many countries escaped or quickly re-
covered from the recession that hit the developed world. This seems to be true also
for parts of the Mediterranean (see Sturm and Sauter, 2010) and the turmoil appears
to have been minor relative, e.g. Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, are business
cycles in the Mediterranean basin becoming more similar? Have increased interde-
pendences brought about cyclical convergence? What is the expected evolution of
Mediterranean cycles in the years to come in light of the policies pursued by the EU?
To analyze these issues the paper employs a panel VAR model of the type de-
veloped in Canova and Ciccarelli (2009), and Canova et al. (2007). The setup can
handle large dynamic panels displaying country speci￿c dynamics and cross country
lagged interdependencies; it allows for time variations in the correlation structure
3across variables and countries; and it facilitates the construction of observable indica-
tors capturing regional, national or exogenous in￿ uences. Finally, it is well suited to
study the international transmission of shocks from one country or area to another.
We uncover three main facts. Cyclical ￿ uctuations in the Mediterranean are het-
erogeneous. On the one hand, regional factors are important and the dynamics of
the regional indicators di⁄er in terms of volatility, persistence and synchronicity. In-
terestingly, trade openness, the level of development, or the monetary arrangement a
country chooses do not determine the composition of a ￿ region￿ ; instead, geograph-
ical proximity matters. On the other, the relative importance of regional factors
for domestic ￿ uctuations is far from uniform and idiosyncratic in￿ uences dominate
the dynamics of macroeconomic variables in several countries. Hence, Mediterranean
￿ uctuations are quite di⁄erent from those observed in other regions of the world.
Second, increased regional interdependences have not changed much these features
and, if we exclude the recent recession, there is little evidence that the relative impor-
tance of idiosyncratic factors declines over time. Furthermore, since time variations
after 1995 are negligible, it seems that EU policies have not done much to reduce the
segmented nature of Mediterranean business cycles.
Third, time variations in the structure of regional cycles are not easily reconciled
with either a pure convergence or a pure decoupling view: both phenomena are in fact
present but, more importantly, both are local and temporary. Moreover, absent some
major structural change, global convergence is unlikely to take place and even regional
convergence seems to be di¢ cult to achieve in the years to come: GDP growth will
be persistently below its national average in the major EU countries, while countries
in the east side of the Mediterranean will return to above average growth rates. For
the rest of the countries, GDP growth will settle at the historical mean level.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the empirical
model and section 3 the data. Section 4 presents the results, section 5 reports some
robustness checks and section 6 concludes.
42 The empirical model
The empirical model employed in the analysis has the form:
yit = Dit(L)Yt￿1 + Fit(L)Wit + eit (1)
where i = 1;:::;N indicates countries, t = 1;:::;T time, and L the lag operator; yit is
a G ￿ 1 vector for each i and Yt = (y0
1t;:::y0
Nt)0; Dit;j are G ￿ NG matrices for each
lag j = 1;:::;p, Fit;j are G￿M matrices each lag j = 1;:::;q; Wit is a M ￿1 vector
of exogenous variables, eit a G ￿ 1 vector of disturbances with variance ￿i.
Model (1) displays three important features, which makes it ideal for our study.
First, dynamic relationships are allowed to be country speci￿c. Without such a
feature, similarities could not be evaluated, heterogeneity biases may be present,
and economic conclusions easily distorted. Second, whenever the NG ￿ NG matrix
Dt(L) = [D1t(L);:::;DNt(L)]0, is not block diagonal for some L, cross-unit lagged
interdependencies matter. Thus, dynamic feedback across countries are possible and
this greatly expands the type of interactions our empirical model can account for.
Third, the coe¢ cients are allowed to vary over time. Absent time variations, it
would be di¢ cult to study convergence and to examine the evolution of business
cycles characteristics. These features add realism to the empirical model and avoid
important speci￿cation errors (see Canova and Ciccarelli, 2009, for a discussion), but
they have a cost. To see why, rewrite (1) in regression format as:
Yt = Zt￿t + Et Et ￿ N (0;￿) (2)
where Zt = ING ￿ X0
t; X0











Nt)0 and ￿it are Gk￿1 vectors containing, stacked, the G rows of the matrix
Dit and Fit, while Yt and Et are NG ￿ 1 vectors of endogenous variables and of ran-
dom disturbances. Since ￿t varies in di⁄erent time periods for each country-variable
pair, it is impossible to estimate it using unrestricted classical methods. However,
even if ￿t = ￿; 8t, its sheer dimensionality (there are k = NGp + Mq parameters in
each equation) prevents any meaningful unconstrained estimation.
52.1 The factorization of the coe¢ cient vector ￿t
To circumvent this problem, we estimate a lower dimensional vector ￿t, which is
assumed to determine ￿t. Let
￿t = ￿￿t + ut ut ￿ N(0;￿ ￿ V ) (3)
where ￿ is a matrix of zeros and ones, dim(￿t) << dim(￿t), and ut is a vector of
disturbances, capturing unmodelled features in the coe¢ cient vector ￿t. For example,
in the speci￿cations we consider ￿￿t = ￿1￿1t + ￿2￿2t + ￿3￿3t where ￿1; ￿2; ￿3 are
loading matrices of dimensions NGk￿s, NGk￿N, NGk￿G; respectively; ￿1t;￿2t;￿3t
are mutually orthogonal factors capturing, respectively, movements in the coe¢ cient
vector which are common across s groups of countries and variables; movements which
are country speci￿c; and movements which are variable speci￿c.
Factoring ￿t as in (3) is advantageous in many respects. Computationally, it
reduces the problem of estimating NGk coe¢ cients into the one of estimating s+N+G
factors characterizing their dynamics. Practically, the factorization (3) transforms an
overparametrized panel VAR into a parsimonious SUR model, where the regressors
are averages of certain right-hand side VAR variables. To see this, substitute (3) into
(2) to have
Yt = Zt￿t + vt (4)
where Zt = Zt￿ and vt = Et + Ztut. Economically, the speci￿cation in (3) is con-
venient since it allows us to decompose ￿ uctuations in Yt, and measure the relative
importance, e.g., of common vs. country speci￿c or of predetermined vs. exoge-
nous in￿ uences, and study their time evolution. For example, when ￿t has at least
two dimensions, WLIt = Z1t￿1t is a common indicator for Yt, while CLIt = Z2t￿2t
is a vector of country speci￿c indicators. Furthermore, since Zt includes predeter-
mined and exogenous variables, each indicator can be decomposed into its prede-










1t ￿1t. WLIt and CLIt are correlated since the same
variables enter in Z1t and Z2t, but become uncorrelated as N increases.
6To complete the speci￿cation we need to describe the evolution of ￿t over time
and the features of its time zero distribution. We let
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t ￿t ￿ N (0;Bt): (5)
with Bt = ￿1 ￿ Bt￿1 + ￿2 ￿ ￿ B, where ￿1;￿2 are scalars, and ￿ B is block diagonal. We
set ￿ = ￿, V = ￿2Ik; and let Et, ut and ￿t be mutually independent.
In (5) the factors evolve over time as random walks; we choose this speci￿cation,
after experimenting with various candidate law of motions since it is parsimonious and
allows to ￿t the data very well. The spherical assumption on V re￿ ects the fact that
the factors have similar units, while setting ￿ = ￿ is standard (see e.g. Kadiyala and
Karlsson, 1997). The variance of ￿t is allowed to be time varying (following Canova,
1993) to account for generic volatility clustering in Yt. Time invariant structures
(￿1 = ￿2 = 0), and homoschedastic variances (￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 1) are special
cases of the assumed process. The block diagonality of ￿ B guarantees orthogonality
of the factors, which is preserved a-posteriori, and hence their identi￿ability. Finally,
independence among the errors is standard.
To summarize, our estimable empirical model has the state space structure:
Yt = (Zt￿)￿t + vt (6)
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t (7)
The structure of (6)-(7) di⁄ers from the one commonly used in the time varying
coe¢ cient literature - typically, the variance of vt, rather than the variance of ￿t, is
time varying. However, in a reduced form sense, the two speci￿cations are equivalent.
Thus, our speci￿cation can also capture volatility changes in the endogenous variables
and has two advantages over alternative setups: it allows for time variations in the
shocks of the loadings and in the reduced form errors to be correlated (as it is done,
e. g., in ARCH-Models); computationally, it is far less burdensome.
While the model (6)-(7) can be estimated both with classical and Bayesian meth-
ods, the latter approach is preferable since the exact small sample distribution of the
7objects of interest can be obtained, even with small T and N (see Del Negro and
Schorfheide, forthcoming, for a hierarchical interpretation of this structure).
2.2 Prior information
To compute posterior distributions for the parameters in (6)-(7), we assume prior
densities for ￿0 = (￿￿1; ￿ B;￿0) and let ￿2;￿1;￿2 be known. We set ￿ Bi = bi ￿ I; i =
1;:::;r, where bi controls the tightness of factor i in the coe¢ cient vector, and make
p(￿￿1;bi;￿0) = p(￿￿1)
Q







and p(￿0 j F￿1) = N
￿￿ ￿0; ￿ R0
￿
where N stands for Normal, W for Wishart and IG for
Inverse Gamma distributions, and F￿1 is the time ￿1 information set. The prior for
￿0 and (7),imply that p(￿t j Ft￿1) = N
￿￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1; ￿ Rt￿1jt￿1 + Bt
￿
.
Let ￿ = (￿2;￿1;￿2;z1;Q1;$0;S0;￿ ￿0; ￿ R0). Values for the elements of ￿ are ei-
ther obtained from the data (this is the case for ￿ ￿0;Q1) to tune up the prior to the
speci￿c application, a-priori selected to produce relatively loose priors (the case of
z1;$0;S0; ￿ R0) or chosen to maximize the explanatory power of the model (the case of
￿2, ￿0;￿1) in an empirical Bayes fashion. The values used are: ￿1 = 1:0;￿2 = 0;z1 =
N￿G+5;Q1 = ^ Q1;$0 = S0 = 1:0;￿ ￿0 = ^ ￿0 and ￿ R0 = Ir. Here ^ Q1 = diag (Q11;:::;Q1N)
and Q1i is the estimated covariance matrix of the time invariant version for each coun-
try VAR; ^ ￿0 is obtained with OLS on a time invariant version of (1) over the entire
sample, and r is the dimension of ￿t. Since the in-sample ￿t improves if ￿2 ! 0, an
exact factorization of ￿t is used.
2.3 Posterior distributions
To calculate the posterior distribution for ￿ = (￿￿1;bi; f￿tgT
t=1), we combine the prior











￿1 (Yt ￿ Zt￿￿t)
#
(8)
where Y T = (Y1;:::;YT) denotes the available sample. Using Bayes rule, p
￿
￿ j Y T￿
=
p(￿)L(Y Tj￿)
p(Y T) / p(￿)L
￿




￿ j Y T￿
, the posterior distribution for the el-
8ements of ￿, can be obtained by integrating out nuisance parameters from p
￿
￿ j Y T￿
.
Once these distributions are found, location and dispersion measures for ￿ and for
any interesting continuous functions of them can be obtained.
For the model we use, it is impossible to compute p
￿
￿ j Y T￿
analytically. A Monte
Carlo techniques which is useful in our context is the Gibbs sampler, since it only
requires knowledge of the conditional posterior distribution of ￿. Denoting ￿￿￿ the
vector ￿ excluding the parameter ￿, these conditional distributions are
￿t j Y
T;￿￿￿t ￿ N











































where ￿ ￿tjT and ￿ RtjT are the smoothed one-period-ahead forecasts of ￿t and of the
variance-covariance matrix of the forecast error, calculated as in Chib and Greenberg
(1995), $i = K + $0, and K = T, if i = 1;K = Tg, if i = 2;K = TN, if i = 3, etc.
Under regularity conditions (see Geweke, 2000), cycling through the conditional
distributions in (9) produces in the limit draws from the joint posterior. From these,
the marginal distributions of ￿t can be computed averaging over draws in the nuisance
dimensions. We have performed standard convergence checks: increasing the length
of the chain; splitting the chains in pieces after a burn-in period and calculating
whether the mean and the variances are similar; checking if cumulative means settle
to some value. The results we present are based on chains with 400000 draws: 2000
blocks of 200 draws were made and the last draw for each block is retained. Hence,
2000 draws are used for posterior inference at each t.
Once the posterior distribution of ￿t is available one can construct the posterior
distribution of the indicators Zjt￿jt and of their components. For example, a credible
90% interval for the common indicator is obtained ordering the h = 1;:::;H draws
of WLIh
t for each t and taking the 5th and the 95th percentile. In addition, with
9(6)-(7), we can compute the fraction of the ￿ uctuations in Yt due to each indicator,
the responses of the indicators to particular shocks and predictive densities for future
Yt+i: Given the nature of our model, impulse responses are computed as the di⁄erence
between two conditional expectations, one generated assuming that a subset of the
vt is equal to one at t and zero afterwards and one generated assuming that vt is zero
at all t ￿for details see Canova and Ciccarelli (2009). Responses of the indicators are
obtained calculating ￿rst the responses of the variables and appropriately averaging
them across variables and countries.
3 The data
The data comes from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) released in the Spring 2011, and covers 16 countries
from 1980 to 2010: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Albania, Cyprus, Malta,
Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Annual data are
employed since quarterly data are consistently available only since the early 2000. We
limit attention to this subset of countries for two reasons. First, data considerations
prevent us to use a larger sample of non-EU countries - in the sensitivity analysis,
we add Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Lebanon, but we are forced to
work with a much shorter time interval. Second, while the UFM partnership relates
the whole EU with non-EU Mediterranean countries, we consider only Mediterranean
EU members to keep our cross section balanced, as far as developed, emerging and
frontier economies are concerned. Focusing on Mediterranean EU may a-priori entail
a loss of information, e.g., when examining ￿ uctuations in Turkey or Cyprus, but we
expect the biases to be small since most of the historical, cultural and economic links
between the EU and the Mediterranean are via Spain, France and Italy.
Business cycle indicators are constructed using real GDP, real consumption and
real investment growth, all converted into international standard via PPP adjust-
ments, as it is typical in the literature (see e.g. Kose et. al. 2009). Other private
10sector variables (such as employment) or public sector variables (such as govern-
ment expenditure or primary balance) are available either irregularly or for a too
short sample to make estimation meaningful. Simultaneously including output and
consumption in the empirical model is crucial to distinguish di⁄erent hypotheses put
forward in the literature (cyclical convergence of consumption and output ￿ uctuations
vs. cyclical consumption convergence and cyclical output divergence). To provide in-
formation about the nature of business cycles in smaller and more open economies,
the analysis also considers terms of trade (TOT) growth and the trade balance to
GDP ratio. They are not directly used in the construction of the cyclical indicators
because the starting point of this data is very irregularly distributed over the sample.
The exogenous variables, all entering contemporaneously in the VAR, are the
world real GDP and the US federal funds rate, both provided by the WEO. After
some experimentation, oil prices were excluded because they are highly correlated
with the world real GDP measure. All the variables of the system are demeaned
and standardized prior to estimation. This makes the equal weighting scheme in (6)-
(7) and the analysis coherent. Given the frequency of the data, lag length selection
criteria all prefer just one lag in the original panel VAR model.
3.1 Some features of the Mediterranean economies
Before proceeding with the analysis, we present some facts about the less known
Mediterranean economies. Most of the information comes from the Euromediter-
ranean statistics compiled by Eurostat; it is available at www.eeas.europa.eu/ eu-
romed/index_en.htm, and refers to 2009, if not otherwise noted.
If we exclude Israel, non-Euro area countries in the Mediterranean are poor. Their
per-capita income ranges from 2,161 US dollar in Egypt to 10,472 US dollars in Turkey
and the poorest countries are all located in the Middle East-North African (MENA)
region. In comparison, the income per-capita of Albania (the only non-EU European
country in our the database) is almost twice as large as the one of Egypt or Morocco.
Poverty ratios reinforce the conclusion: between 20 and 30 percent of the population
11is poor in Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt.
Despite the existence of trade and tari⁄barriers, the majority of the economies of
the Mediterranean region are open. For example, the trade to GDP ratio for the coun-
tries in the MENA region is above 80 percent and exceeds 100 percent in Tunisia (data
refers here to 2007). Trade by non-EU countries of the region with EU members is
about 10 percent of total EU trade and has consistently increased since 2004 at a rate
of about 10 percent a year. Similarly, the share of EU trade in non-EU countries has
increased, even though at a smaller rate (about 5 percent a year). Thus, North-South
trade linkages have intensi￿ed over time but not dramatically so. Morocco, Algeria,
Turkey and Israel are the countries which trade most with EU members. Trade is pri-
marily concentrated in goods (in particular, fuel, manufacturing and clothing) while
trade in services is low ￿less than 5 percent of total EU trade. Interestingly, bilateral
￿ ows among the non-EU countries of the region are low in absolute terms (less than
5 percent of the total) and relative to other regions of the world (e.g. bilateral trade
in Asia accounts for roughly 30 percent of total trade). Infrastructural bottlenecks,
trade restrictions and, most importantly, non-complementarity of the exports could
be responsible for this pattern.
FDIs from the richer to the poorer nations of the Mediterranean have doubled
since 2000 but their magnitude is still small: in absolute terms they account for less
than one percent of the total FDIs of the EU. Lack of transparency and poor business
environment are typically blamed for these low numbers but lack of infrastructures
and absence of regional markets are also signi￿cant factors. Financial linkages are not
quanti￿able, but are likely to be limited by legislation restrictions and the riskiness of
the region, plagued by civil and religious con￿ icts. Most the less advanced countries in
the regions have ￿nancial sectors which are bank-based, with underdeveloped capital
markets and this may explain the limited spillover of the global ￿nancial turmoil to
the region (see Sturm and Sauter (2010) for details).
Migrations from the East to the West of the Mediterranean were strong in the early
1990s but they have been progressively substituted by South to the North migrations.
12Remittances from the EU are important for North African countries, even though
migrations ￿ ows have been reduced in the last few years, and they account between
12-20 percent of the annual GDP in Morocco and 6-9 percent of annual GDP in
Egypt. Thus, remittances, more than trade and FDIs, could be important source of
imported ￿ uctuations in portions of the Mediterranean.
Finally, the role of tourism as a source of transmission of cyclical ￿ uctuations
needs to be emphasized. The Mediterranean region receives a considerable amount
of tourists every year and the ￿ ow from the EU has been quite cyclical, re￿ ecting
the conditions of the domestic economies. For example, the percentage of tourists
entering Tunisia from the EU has su⁄ered a 10 percent decline during the slowdown
of 2001 and 2002 relative to the previous years. Also, given that the tourism industry
accounts for a large fraction of employment and GDP in many of the poor countries
in the region, ￿ uctuations in tourist arrivals and expenditure could be an important
source of disturbances in many countries. To give an idea of the importance of the
sector, in Tunisia tourism accounts for almost 25 percent of GDP and more than 30
percent of employment and in Egypt around 15 percent of GDP and 18 percent of
employment. Even in countries with less developed tourism industry, such as Albania,
the sector has grown at a rate of about 15 percent a year in the last 5 years and now
accounts for about 10 percent of total GDP.
In sum, trade in goods, remittances and tourism could be important channels
through which ￿ uctuations are transmitted across in the region. Cyclical conditions
in the EU may be an important factor for domestic ￿ uctuations in each of the non-
EU Mediterranean countries, but intra non-EU spillovers are likely to be small. An
interesting question is whether remittances and tourism are su¢ cient to make cyclical
￿ uctuations in countries facing di⁄erent types of shocks alike. Similarly, one would
like to know whether stronger interdependences changed the nature of ￿ uctuations in
the area or whether idiosyncratic factors still dominate.
Table A.1 in the appendix presents a few cyclical statistics for the variables used
in the investigation. Overall, there appears to be substantial di⁄erences in the un-
13conditional moments we report. In addition, di⁄erences do not seem to be easily
reconciled with the institutional or development indicators used in the literature. In
the next sections, we dig deeper into these issues with our panel-VAR model.
4 The results
The presentation is organized around four main themes: similarities of cyclical ￿ uc-
tuations; relative importance of exogenous, regional and idiosyncratic factors in ex-
plaining the ￿ uctuations; convergence of ￿ uctuations over time; future evolution of
business cycles in the area. Each theme is discussed in a separate subsection.
4.1 Are cyclical ￿ uctuations alike?
To start with, we examine whether Mediterranean business cycles are similar and, if
not, what kind of characteristics matter for grouping ￿ uctuations in the area. To this
end, we estimate a number of models, allowing ￿1t; the common factor in the coe¢ -
cient vector to have one, two, three or four dimensions. To be precise, all models we
consider have 16 country-speci￿c, 3 variable-speci￿c factors in the coe¢ cient vector,
thus acknowledging the possibility these in￿ uences may be present in the data, but
di⁄er in the speci￿cation of the common factor structure. In the baseline model, the
common factor is a scalar; in the alternative models, it has more dimensions. Hence,
the baseline model would give a good ￿t if ￿ uctuations in the basin were similar; the
alternatives would be preferable if ￿ uctuations cluster around di⁄erent poles of at-
traction. Since there are many ways of assigning the coe¢ cients into groups, we follow
Canova (2004) and create groups using observable indicators. Among all combina-
tions we tried, we report in Table 1 a subset which possess two characteristics: groups
have some meaningful economic interpretation; the ￿t of the model ￿as measured by
the marginal likelihood ￿is good.
The marginal likelihood, which we compute using an harmonic mean estimator,
is akin to an ￿ R2, and tells us whether ￿ uctuations in the endogenous variables are
14explained by the model or not. Thus, for a given number of groups, the higher is
the marginal likelihood of a particular assignment to groups, the better the ￿t is. To
formally evaluate the goodness of ￿t across speci￿cations which di⁄er either in the
assignment to the groups, given a number of groups, or in the number of groups, one
needs a loss function. With a standard 0-1 loss function, di⁄erences of 2.2 (4) in the
log of the marginal likelihood will make a model signi￿cantly (de￿nitively) worse.
The model with one common factor is inferior to all other models and di⁄erences
are large. Thus, ￿ uctuations in the Mediterranean basin are not alike. However, it
is somewhat more di¢ cult to decide how many groups should be allowed for and
along which dimension cyclical ￿ uctuations should be clustered around. A common
factor with four dimensions is preferable to a common factor with two dimensions,
but di⁄erences when the common factor has three or four dimensions are small.
Interestingly, taking the number of groups as given, the best ￿tting models all have
nice economic interpretations. For example, the best speci￿cation obtained when the
common factor has two dimensions is the one that loads one factor on the coe¢ cients
of the variables of Euro area countries and the other on the coe¢ cients of the vari-
ables of the other countries; in a model with three common factors, the best ￿tting
models are obtained when factors load along income and geographical dimensions.
Note that when the common factor has either three or four dimensions, clustering
business cycles using trade openness or the level of development produce a lower ￿t 1.
Thus, economies with similar trade openness or similar level of development do not
necessarily have more similar business cycles, and intensifying trade ties, as proposed
by the UFM partnership, will not necessarily make Mediterranean cycles more alike.
The best speci￿cation clusters business cycles in four clubs: one includes the vari-
ables of Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece (which, for ease of exposition,
we label the West), one the variables of Cyprus, Albania, Malta, Turkey (labelled
the East), one the variables of Syria, Israel and Jordan (labelled the Middle East)
1One can guess that this occurs because the major trading partners of some countries are outside
the Mediterranean and because remittances and tourism overshadow the importance of development
indicators.
15and one the variables of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (labelled North Africa).
While this is not an exact geographical ordering, geography seems important to deter-
mine how cyclical ￿ uctuations behave 2. Since standard explanations for geographical
patterns are hard to entertain - production structures are quite similar in the Mediter-
ranean and institutions are still fragile in many countries - further research, along the
lines of Altug et. al. (2011), is needed to explain this ￿nding.
The literature typically conditions on the level of development or similar indi-
cators in examining cyclical ￿ uctuations and, for example, Kose et al. (2009) in
their analysis of world business cycles ￿nd that the relevant distinction is between
developed, developing and emerging markets economies. Others, for example Altug
and Bildirici (2010), believe that the global or local nature of shocks matters. Our
results are closer in spirit to those of Benczur and Raftai (2010) who, using simple
unconditional statistics, ￿nd that the preferred grouping of the business cycles of 58
world economies has to do with their historical and geographical characteristics. Our
￿ndings are also consistent with those of Canova et al. (2009), who ￿nd that changes
in monetary arrangements had limited e⁄ects on cyclical ￿ uctuations in Europe.
4.1.1 The dynamic patterns of regional indicators
To better understand the outcome of our clustering procedure and to highlight in
what way regional cycles are di⁄erent, Figure 1 plots the four regional indicators the
best model produces. In each box there are three lines: the black line is the median
of the posterior distribution at each point in time; the blue lines represent a pointwise
68 percent posterior credible set. In the ￿rst box, together with the West indicator,
we also plot in red, the indicator obtained in a model with just one common factor.
The West indicator is relatively persistent, it displays three recessions located at
the o¢ cial CEPR dates for the whole Euro area (represented by the shaded area),
two relatively vigorous expansions culminating with peaks in 1988 and 1998, and a
2When the MENA region is treated as a whole the model has only a marginally lower ￿t than
the best speci￿cation while using an exact geographical classi￿cation, i.e. moving Greece into the
East and Malta into North Africa, considerably reduces the ￿t (log marginal likelihood = -1433) .
16signi￿cant slowdown around 2001-2002. The synchronicity of the cyclical ￿ uctuations
in the region changes over time and dispersion is largest around the two cyclical peaks
(posterior credible sets are wider at these dates). The current recession is deeper
than the two previous ones - both the median value and the credible set are much
lower than in other occasions - and somewhat more persistent. Thus, this indicators
captures well what is known about business cycles of Southern members of the EU
and this should increase our con￿dence about what the model delivers for the cyclical
￿ uctuations of less studied Mediterranean areas. Note that the West indicator and
the common indicator are not perfectly correlated - the latter also captures in￿ uences
present in the East and in the MENA regions - since the standardization we employ
puts ￿ uctuations in small and large economies on the same scale.
The East indicator is much less persistent than the West indicator and has nu-
merous ups and downs. In particular, it displays signi￿cant recessions with troughs
in 1985, 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2009, roughly every 3-4 years, and visible ex-
pansions culminating with peaks in 1987, 1995, 2004. The relative frequency of the
ups and downs makes the indicator very similar to the one obtained for a selected
number of developing economies in e.g. Kose and Prasad (2010). The synchronicity
of the cyclical ￿ uctuations in this region also changes over time but dispersion does
not necessarily increase around the cyclical peaks. Three other features make the
East indicator di⁄erent from the West indicators: i) expansion and recession phases
are, roughly, of similar length; ii) cycles are more symmetric in amplitude, and iii)
downturns are more synchronized with US downturns than with EU downturns (the
shaded areas here are NBER recession phases) - the fact that Turkey and Cyprus
have important links with Anglo-Saxons countries may be the responsible for this
fact. Thus, excluding the last three years, business cycles in the East and the West
of the Mediterranean are fundamentally di⁄erent (see table 2 for other statistics).
The Middle East indicator has peculiar features. It displays relatively long reces-
sionary periods (see, e.g. the period from 1982 to 1990); persistent stagnation phases
(see, the period from 1995 to 2003), and relatively sharp but short expansions (the
17shaded areas here are NBER recession phases) . The ￿ uctuations of this indicator
have low concordance with both EU and US ￿ uctuations, and for example, in the
1990-92 period, when the US and the EU were simultaneously or individually in a
recession, the indicator displays a period of sustained expansion. Interestingly, the
indicator shows only a mild and temporary decline after 2008, indicating that the
countries of this block largely escaped the turmoil a⁄ecting developed countries.
The North African indicator displays important negative serial correlation, con-
siderable volatility and two long upward trends starting in 1994 and 2001. The last
expansionary episode lasts until the end of the sample but a considerable slowdown
occurs after 2008. Thus, over the last two decades, the countries of this block dis-
played a generic process of growth convergence within the Mediterranean, a process
similar to the one experienced by other frontier economies relative to the rest of the
world (see Kose and Prasad, 2010). The timing of the cyclical ￿ uctuations in this
region is di⁄erent from the one observed in the EU or the US (shaded areas here
are the union of CEPR and NBER o¢ cial recession dates): the indicator features
three recessionary phases, with troughs in 1982, 1986, 1991-93 and four expansion
phases culminating in 1983, 1990 and 1998 and 2008. Since some countries in the
block are oil and gas exporters, one may conjecture that the persistent increase in
oil and natural gas prices has something to do with the long expansion of the 2000s.
Such an explanation, however, is not very compelling because not all the countries
in the region enjoy these resources; and because oil prices are highly correlated with
the world GDP measure we use. Structural reforms, including more open access to
internal markets, are more likely to be responsible for the growth convergence pattern
experienced by the region.
In sum, our approach clusters Mediterranean cycles around di⁄erent (regional)
poles of attraction because ￿ uctuations in the basin are heterogeneous in terms of
amplitude, duration, and concordance. In addition, while the features of regional
cycles are evolving, there is little evidence that they are becoming more similar, and
geographical proximity with the EU had, at least so far, little in￿ uence on the way
18non-EU Mediterranean economies behave over the cycle. The crisis of 2008 altered
this pattern, but it is to early to decide whether the stronger comovements experienced
after that date herald a permanent change in the nature of Mediterranean ￿ uctuations
or are simply the result of a powerful common shock.
4.2 The drivers of domestic ￿ uctuations
To highlight what drives cyclical ￿ uctuations in the region and to quantify how in-
tegrated the Mediterranean is in the world economy, we report in Table 3, for each
country-variable pair, the average fraction of the volatility explained by the prede-
termined portion of the regional indicators (panel A) and by the exogenous indicator
(panel B), calculated as WLIex
t + CLIex
t . We also decompose the ￿ uctuations in
each variable, for each country, and at each point in time into their components and
plot, in ￿gures 2 to 4, the actual values of the variables and the contributions of the
predetermined regional indicators (blue bars) and of the idiosyncratic indicators (red
bars), where the latter captures variable plus idiosyncratic factors.
In the West, and excluding Greece, the regional indicator explains a large pro-
portion of output, consumption and investment growth ￿ uctuations on average, but
little of the ￿ uctuations in the trade balance to GDP ratio and in TOT growth. The
percentage for output is larger than the one reported in e.g. Canova et al. (2007) or
Kose and Prasad (2010), because the regional indicator is more homogeneous. Had
one used, e.g. all the countries in the EU to build the indicator, these percentages
would have been considerably smaller. The proportions vary over time and the rela-
tive importance of the regional indicator increases, e.g., in France, Spain, Portugal in
1998 and 2008, and decreases, e.g., in Spain and Greece in the early 2000s. Note also,
somewhat surprisingly, that idiosyncratic in￿ uences are generally more important for
consumption growth than for output or investment growth
In the East, the regional indicator explains little of the ￿ uctuations in real GDP,
consumption and investment growth, and has almost no explanatory power for the
trade balance to GDP ratio and for TOT growth. Here idiosyncratic factors mat-
19ter quite a lot and dominate, e.g., output ￿ uctuations in Malta, consumption and
investment ￿ uctuations in Cyprus, and output and consumption ￿ uctuations in Al-
bania. In Turkey instead regional and idiosyncratic factors equally matter for output,
consumption or investment growth ￿ uctuations.
In the Middle East, the average proportion of ￿ uctuations explained by the re-
gional indicator is low. In addition, idiosyncratic factors become more important
as time goes by, at least for consumption and investment growth. In North Africa,
cyclical ￿ uctuations of output, consumption and investment growth are dominated
by a combination of country speci￿c and idiosyncratic in￿ uences but their relative
importance changes over time. Interestingly, the regional indicator largely drives the
growth miracle of the last decade, supporting the idea that common institutional
changes may be at the root of the convergence process. The regional indicator ex-
plains a slightly larger percentage of the ￿ uctuations in the trade balance to GDP
ratio and in TOT growth in this region, but the numbers are still small.
The importance of exogenous factors in explaining ￿ uctuations in output, con-
sumption and investment growth is uniformly low. Thus, world economic conditions
a⁄ect basic macroeconomic variables only indirectly - via lags of the endogenous
variables - rather than directly. Exogenous factors are however more important for
￿ uctuations in TOT growth and in trade balance to GDP ratio.
Taken together these patterns stand in striking contrast with those reported for
other parts of the world and go against the predictions of a number of models of
the international business cycle. For example, the dichotomy we uncover, with con-
sumption, investment and output growth primarily explained by endogenous factors
and TOT growth and trade balance to GDP ratio primarily explained by exogenous
factors, imply sectorial segmentations and the presence of di⁄erent types of shocks
driving the dynamics of domestic variables. Moreover, the fact that in many countries
idiosyncratic factors are more important for consumption than output growth makes
it di¢ cult to rationalize cyclical ￿ uctuations as optimal responses of risk averse agents
to output shocks and highlights the role that (underground) remittances may have in
20driving a cyclical wedge between the two variables. Similarly, the fact that, over the
cross section, output and consumption ￿ uctuations are not necessarily driven by the
same type of disturbances make the evidence hard to reconcile with the idea that TFP
di⁄erences drive cross-country cyclical di⁄erences. Finally, since trade links increased
after 1995, but the pre and post 1995 evidence is roughly similar, cast serious doubts
about the role of trade in making Mediterranean cycles more interconnected.
4.3 Convergence or decoupling?
The question of whether cyclical ￿ uctuations are converging or not has received a lot
of attention in the literature, but the conclusion is still controversial. The fact that
idiosyncratic sources of ￿ uctuations matter for a number of countries in the region, but
their importance is neither systematically increasing nor systematically decreasing,
seems inconsistent with both the convergence and the decoupling propositions.
To provide further evidence on the issue, we plot in ￿gure 5, pairwise rolling cor-
relations between the regional indicators. Rolling correlations are computed using 10
years of data ending at the date listed on the horizontal axis. If convergence (decou-
pling) takes place, we should see these correlations uniformly increase (decrease) with
time. The correlations display distinct periods of convergence and decoupling across
di⁄erent regions. For example, the estimated correlation between the West and the
East indicators has a U-shaped pattern: the correlations was positive in the 1980s,
it dropped to zero in the middle of the 1990s, and dramatically increased after 2008.
A similar pattern is visible when considering the West and the Middle East indica-
tors, while the correlation between the West and the North Africa indicators starts
negative, becomes positive and high in the 1990s and drops close to zero afterwards.
The only correlation which clearly indicates convergence is the one of the East and
the Middle East indicators: it starts negative, it becomes positive in the 1990s and
reaches a stable maximum afterwards. Thus, cyclical ￿ uctuations in the basin have
gone through periods of increased and decreased synchronicity.
Figure 6, which presents the dynamic responses of the East, Middle East and
21North African indicators to a positive shock common to the variables of the West
has a similar message. Dynamic e⁄ects are computed orthogonalizing the covariance
matrix of the reduced form shocks, assuming that the West block comes ￿rst - a
natural choice given the patterns of trade, remittance and tourism ￿ ows previously
discussed. The panels report responses computed in 1993, 2002, 2007; black lines
represent median estimates; blue lines the 68 percent posterior intervals.
Shocks originating in the West had di⁄erent e⁄ects on the North African indicator
over time: responses ￿rst become stronger relative to the 1992 and then weaker - an
initial process of convergence was aborted later on. Consistently with the rolling
correlations evidence, the responses of the East and the Middle East show similar
patterns and, relative to 1992, the transmission from the West has equally weakened
in the East and the Middle East. Thus, regional interdependences are changing over
time, but the changes are temporary and the direction of the changes is region speci￿c.
As far as we know, a pattern of this type has not been previously documented and
calls into question common explanations for the convergence/decoupling phenomena
based on TFP or on structural parameter di⁄erences.
4.4 What is next?
How persistent are the patterns we have described in the previous subsection? To
shed light on future business cycle developments in Mediterranean we conduct a
simple forecasting exercise: we use information up to 2010 to estimate the model and
forecast assuming that during the prediction sample that no shocks will hit either the
variables or the estimated coe¢ cients and that the exogenous variables will take the
values forecasted by the WEO. Our empirical model is well suited for this exercise
and, as shown in Canova and Ciccarelli, 2009, it has good properties when compared
with existing forecasting approaches.
Figure 7 reports, for each country, the value of the real GDP growth up to 2010
and the 90 percent posterior credible forecast interval (the blue dashed lines) for
2011-2015. For comparison, we also plot WEO forecasts for the same horizons (red
22solid line) even though they di⁄er in two important aspects: they include information
up to the second quarter of 2011, which is not available in our annual model; they
are based on country speci￿c semi-structural models rather than a purely descriptive
statistical multi-country model.
Our forecasts are close to those of the WEO and, for many countries, the qualita-
tive features of the predictions coincide. For example, for the countries in the West
region, the current stagnation is expected to last long and there is a non-negligible
probability that the growth rate of real GDP in 2011-2015 will be below its mean
value. Our predictions for the 2011-2012 are slightly rosier for Portugal and signi￿-
cantly worse for Greece but di⁄erences with WEO forecasts are eliminated by 2013.
In the East bloc, no double-dip recession is expected and in some countries, such as
Cyprus and Malta, growth is expected to be vigorous. Di⁄erences with WEO fore-
casts are larger for this region and, for example, our forecasts are more bullish for
Malta and Cyprus and more bearish for Turkey, at least for 2012. Thus, di¢ culties
for East Mediterranean countries were transitory and real GDP is expected to revert
to (above) normal growth rate in the future.
The forecasts for the Middle East region are generally less upbeat than those of
the WEO and our model predicts that the growth rate of real GDP for these countries
will revert to the average national level experienced over the past decade. Finally,
the forecast for the North Africa countries are mixed but the long positive di⁄erential
expansion these countries experienced in the last decade is likely to end. Clearly,
since our model conditions on the information available at the end of 2010, it misses
the drop in GDP growth due to the popular uprising of the ￿rst part of 2011. On
the other hand, the sustained growth pattern predicted by the WEO for Egypt and
Tunisia in 2014-2015 rests on the assumption that structural reforms will achieve their
goals, a scenario which is unquanti￿able in our model.
To summarize, if the existing conditions continue unchanged into the future, the
West will su⁄er longer than the East, and the path of GDP growth in Western coun-
tries is expected to be below its national average for quite a while. In addition,
23the extraordinary expansion phase experienced by the North Africa region is likely
to terminate. All in all, global convergence of GDP ￿ uctuations is unlikely to take
place in the basin in the years to come. But perhaps more importantly, even regional
convergence seems di¢ cult to achieve. In each of the boxes of ￿gure 7 we report,
in green, the average growth rate of the region. In many instances, the green line
is outside the posterior 90 percent credible set in the forecasting sample, indicating
that the national segmentation of ￿ uctuations will not disappear in the near future.
5 Some robustness analysis
Data of countries other than the 16 we consider are consistently available only since
the late 1990￿ s. What would happen to our conclusions if a larger cross section (but
a shorter time series) is used to select the speci￿cation of the model and to construct
indicators? Would the tendencies we have described change? Would heterogene-
ity become stronger or weaker? To answer these questions we add Croatia, Bosnia
Montenegro, Slovenia, Lebanon to our sample of countries but use data from 2000
in the estimation. The shorter time series makes median estimates less reliable, but
the presence of a su¢ ciently large cross section keeps standard errors reasonable and
estimation results interpretable.
We examined the ￿t of various model speci￿cations and con￿rmed that clustering
along a geographical dimension is preferable to clustering along the trade or the devel-
opment dimension. Once again, the ￿t of a model with three geographical indicators
is close to the one with four indicators, but the latter remains the best. The optimal
grouping is now strictly less geographical but location is still a strong attractor to
group cycles. In fact, the West indicator still captures ￿ uctuations which are common
to France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece; the Balcan-East indicator now captures
￿ uctuations common to Cyprus, Malta, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia and
Bosnia; the Middle East indicator captures cycles common to Turkey, Israel, Jordan,
Syria and Lebanon. Finally, the North Africa indicator captures cycles common to
24Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.
Figure 8 plots the time path of the indicators the extended model delivers. For
comparison, we superimposed in red the point estimate of the indicator obtained with
the sample of 16 countries. While there are understandable numerical di⁄erences, the
pattern of the two indicators over the common sample is very similar. There is a
signi￿cant downturn in Mediterranean EU in 2008 and a similar signi￿cant downturn
in the Balcan- East region at the same date; the Middle East indicator shows a
sustained growth period in the mid-2000s and a mild recession since 2008; the North
Africa indicator displays sustained growth-convergence in the 2000s, partially inter-
rupted in 2009. Thus, the heterogeneities we found are robust. In addition, the
optimal groupings we obtain con￿rm that being part of the Euro is not crucial to
understand the nature of cyclical ￿ uctuations in the basin.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the features of cyclical ￿ uctuations in 16 Mediterranean coun-
tries, studies the relative importance of exogenous, regional and idiosyncratic factors
in determining the magnitude of the ￿ uctuations, examines the nature of the conver-
gence process and forecasts future tendencies in the area. The analysis is conducted
with a dynamics statistical model which allows for country speci￿c dynamics, cross
country lagged interdependencies and time variations, and permits the construction
of observable indicators capturing a number of interesting in￿ uences.
The analysis uncovers three major facts. First, Mediterranean cycles are quite
heterogeneous but heterogeneities are not associated with the typical development or
trade indicators, emphasized in the literature. Instead, there seems to be a geograph-
ical component in the ￿ uctuations, not directly linked with di⁄erence in production
structures or monetary institutions. Idiosyncratic in￿ uences matter quite a lot for
some countries in the basin, and although not uniformly, they a⁄ect consumption
more than output growth. Thus, business cycles in the Mediterranean are not alike;
25their structure di⁄ers from the one observed in, say, East Asia or South America;
their evolution does not conform to the general international trends; and integration
e⁄orts have done little to change their segmented structure.
Second, while there are changes in the way EU cyclical ￿ uctuations are transmitted
to the countries in the area, these changes are not easily reconciled with either a pure
convergence or a pure decoupling view of cyclical ￿ uctuations. Both phenomena
seem to be present in Mediterranean, but more importantly, both appear to be local
and temporary. Thus, also in this aspect, the Mediterranean di⁄ers from the broad
international trends described, e.g., in Kose and Prasad, 2010.
Third, if the current state persists, global cyclical convergence is unlikely to occur
and even regional convergence will be di¢ cult to obtain. There will be readjustments
in the years to come, with Mediterranean EU countries su⁄ering for quite a long time
and countries in the east quickly returning to above average growth rates. However,
GDP cycles are not expected to become more similar in the years to come.
The policy implications of our ￿ndings are numerous. For example, the pres-
ence of important heterogeneities and their persistence over time, despite the recent
integration e⁄orts by the EU, casts doubts about the e⁄ectiveness of the UFM part-
nership, at least in the current format. Many countries in the Mediterranean live out
of tourism revenues and remittances. Thus fostering mobility more than intensifying
trade or ￿nancial ties may help to make business cycles more alike in the area. The
fact that idiosyncratic features matter and that their relative weight is expected to be
unchanged in the near future is also important. Whether this is a good or a bad news
for policy depends on whether one has in mind some regional insurance mechanism
(idiosyncrasies are good) or a currency area mechanism (idiosyncrasies are bad). No
matter which view is taken, the process of integration and shared prosperity, envi-
sioned by the UFM partnership, still has a long way to go.
Our analysis also has important implications for theoretical models of the in-
ternational business cycles. For example, the fact that cross-country di⁄erences in
business cycle ￿ uctuations do not appear to be related with natural resources, pro-
26duction structures, ￿nancial market frictions or di⁄erences in the productivity process
cast doubts on existing theories explaining international di⁄erences in business cycles.
Moreover, the fact that cycles in the major macroeconomic variables are driven by
idiosyncratic forces in a number of countries is also a major setback for current models
of the business cycle where consumption smoothing in the face of ￿ uctuating income
is a priority for risk averse agents. To understand the nature of cyclical ￿ uctuations
in the area current models need to be modi￿ed in many directions - for example, they
need to be highly disaggregated and have important national speci￿cities - and the
role of tourism and remittances should be explicitly taken into account.
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29Table 1: Log Marginal Likelihoods
Model One common Two common Three common Three common Three common
Development Income Trade
Log ML -1440 -1433 -1433 -1431 -1438
Model Three common Four common Four common Four common Four common
Geography Trade Geography Income Development
Log ML -1430 -1431 -1429 -1430 -1431
In the model with two common factors, one loads on the variables of countries adopting the Euro
and one for the others. The model with three common factors clusters countries according
to the level of development (low, medium, high); the level of income (low, medium, high);
trade openness (low, medium, high); and the location (West, East and MENA). The model
with four common factors slices countries according to trade (low, medium, high, extreme);
level of development (very low, below average, above average, high); the level of income
(very low, below average, above average, high); and according to location (West, East,
Middle East and North Africa). The best model with four common indicators has one
indicator loading on the coe¢ cients of the variables of Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and
Greece, one on the coe¢ cients of the variables of Malta, Cyprus, Albania, and Turkey; one
for the coe¢ cients of the variables of Israel, Syria and Jordan; the last on the coe¢ cients
of the variables of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.
Table 2: Basic statistics
Indicator West East Middle East North Africa
Standard deviation 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.20
AR(1) 0.66 0.03 0.23 0.31
Contemporaneous correlation with West 0.42 -0.06 0.01
The indicators are computed with the best model found in table 1.
30Table 3.A: Percentage of the variance explained by the regional indicators
Output Investment Consumption Trade balance TOT
growth growth growth over GDP growth
West France 0.83 0.82 0.56 0.12 0.15
Italy 0.64 0.73 0.68 0.01 0.02
Spain 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.03 0.01
Portugal 0.65 0.58 0.49 0.01 0.10
Greece 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.01 0.01
East Cyprus 0.42 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.18
Malta 0.23 0.37 0.18 0.06 0.01
Turkey 0.44 0.31 0.28 0.03 0.07
Albania 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.05
Middle Israel 0.41 0.39 0.27 0.01 0.06
East Jordan 0.44 0.35 0.45 0.03 0.01
Syria 0.57 0.08 0.31 0.01 0.03
North Egypt 0.23 0.27 0.04 0.01 0.13
Africa Morocco 0.13 0.41 0.06 0.13 0.09
Algeria 0.43 0.57 0.35 0.22 0.10
Tunisia 0.12 0.28 0.24 0.01 0.14
Table 3.B: Percentage of the variance explained by exogenous factors
Output Investment Consumption Trade balance TOT
growth growth growth over GDP growth
West France 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.15
Italy 0.11 0.03 0.15 0.21 0.38
Spain 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.33
Portugal 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.25 0.29
Greece 0.14 0.28 0.15 0.22 0.28
East Cyprus 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.16
Malta 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.38
Turkey 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.16
Albania 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.37 0.40
Middle Israel 0.17 0.01 0.15 0.11 0.21
East Jordan 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.15
Syria 0.09 0.22 0.04 0.09 0.21
North Egypt 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.29 0.04
Africa Morocco 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.12
Algeria 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.04
Tunisia 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.24 0.14
31Figure 1. Regional Indicators
Posterior median (black), 68% Bayesian credible interval (blue), and median common indicator (red)
West





































































































































































































































5Figure 4. Historical decomposition







































































































































0.8Figure 6. Generalised impulse responses. Shock to West variables  
Posterior median and 68% Bayesian credible interval
Responses of the EAST indicator





Responses of the Middle East indicator





Responses of the North Africa indicator




0.10Figure 7. Forecasting GDP growth: Comparing with the WEO  
WEO (red), 68% Bayesian credible interval (blue), and regional mean (green) 
Italy


























































































































5.5Figure 8. Regional Indicators. Extended model
Posterior median (black), 68% Bayesian credible interval (blue), and median indicator of original model (red)
West









































0.30FRANCE ITALY SPAIN PORTUGAL
pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT
std dev 1.39 4.10 1.41 0.01 2.47 1.66 4.36 1.76 0.02 5.36 2.36 6.93 2.11 0.02 4.78 2.74 7.96 2.54 0.03 6.01
AR(1) 0.79 0.69 0.82 0.96 0.03 0.74 0.41 0.67 0.77 0.00 0.83 0.75 0.88 0.97 0.38 0.82 0.53 0.79 0.96 -0.20
min corr -0.24 -0.30 -0.25 -0.48 -0.65 -0.24 -0.39 -0.23 -0.43 -0.36 -0.35 -0.38 -0.26 -0.59 -0.51 -0.65 -0.56 -0.30 -0.28 -0.36
max corr 0.72 0.86 0.85 0.68 0.85 0.69 0.75 0.85 0.68 0.76 0.72 0.86 0.85 0.70 0.85 0.63 0.62 0.68 0.57 0.71
GREECE CYPRUS MALTA TURKEY
pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT
std dev 2.68 8.09 2.70 0.03 9.61 5.07 8.62 2.81 0.05 2.97 6.16 11.21 2.68 0.05 2.01 4.82 13.42 4.37 0.02 7.29
AR(1) 0.77 0.36 0.72 0.99 -0.01 0.56 0.08 0.76 0.99 -0.06 0.43 0.11 0.76 1.00 -0.18 0.48 0.04 0.45 0.98 -0.13
min corr -0.35 -0.32 -0.14 -0.54 -0.36 -0.24 -0.26 -0.23 -0.25 -0.16 -0.42 -0.34 -0.39 -0.53 -0.10 -0.26 -0.27 -0.33 -0.68 -0.56
max corr 0.57 0.63 0.61 0.70 0.45 0.45 0.41 0.63 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.39 0.53 0.65 0.12 0.18 0.39 0.38 0.77 0.23
ALBANIA ISRAEL SYRIA JORDAN
pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT
std dev 8.09 47.25 8.02 0.13 23.58 4.33 10.91 2.47 0.04 3.26 8.75 17.03 4.93 0.09 14.43 9.45 12.18 4.98 0.07 19.09
AR(1) -0.19 0.20 0.42 0.94 0.09 0.68 0.53 0.80 0.91 -0.09 0.36 0.23 0.57 0.97 -0.22 -0.01 0.38 0.39 0.80 0.11
min corr -0.39 -0.50 -0.33 -0.76 -0.51 -0.16 -0.39 -0.35 -0.56 -0.25 -0.30 -0.32 -0.26 -0.27 -0.28 -0.43 -0.56 -0.35 -0.18 -0.26
max corr 0.36 0.36 0.44 0.62 0.46 0.31 0.17 0.34 0.56 0.23 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.62 0.63 0.33 0.41 0.36 0.46 0.24
EGYPT MOROCCO ALGERIA TUNISIA
pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT pcr inv gdp trade ToT
std dev 3.96 16.27 2.13 0.03 8.77 5.17 6.81 4.60 0.06 6.71 3.83 7.27 2.48 0.09 20.40 2.34 9.43 2.30 0.02 3.76
AR(1) 0.40 0.04 0.97 0.98 -0.53 -0.02 0.52 0.15 1.02 -0.34 0.57 0.46 0.78 0.92 0.07 0.74 0.39 0.77 0.97 0.13
min corr -0.35 -0.03 -0.34 -0.16 -0.26 -0.35 -0.20 -0.33 -0.76 -0.26 -0.65 -0.50 -0.39 -0.70 -0.65 -0.43 -0.27 -0.21 -0.36 -0.44
max corr 0.33 0.55 0.36 0.44 0.63 0.26 0.55 0.27 0.77 0.50 0.55 0.44 0.36 0.50 0.24 0.55 0.46 0.26 0.43 0.45
TABLE A1. Stylized facts